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European Central Bank working paper series 33Abstract 
 
Many economists are convinced that longer-term benefits from fiscal consolidation are in a 
trade-off with short-term deceleration in output growth. However, more recent research suggests 
that curbing fiscal imbalances contributes to faster growth already in the short term. This paper 
is about such non-Keynesian effects. Section two systematizes theoretical explanations. Section 
three reviews previous empirical research. Section four uses panel estimation techniques to 
examine the consequences of fiscal consolidation in New Member States. This analysis provides 
evidence that in those countries fiscal consolidation contributed substantially to the acceleration 
of output growth even in the short term. However, the exact channels through which non-
Keynesian effects occurred could not be unambiguously identified in the paper. Section five 
takes the new step of a qualitative analysis of the outcomes of strong fiscal adjustments in the 
countries under consideration. That analysis shows that their experiences were quite similar to 
those of developed countries.  
 
 
Keywords: fiscal consolidation, non-Keynesian effects, new member states 
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‘Fiscal contraction’, ‘fiscal adjustment’, ‘fiscal consolidation’, ‘tightening fiscal 
policy’ - all these terms mean reducing imbalances in public finances. An ‘imbalance in 
public finances’ is when the state spends more than it receives from taxation. All 
economists believe that fiscal consolidation is beneficial for the economy in the long term. 
However, most economists believe that the same fiscal consolidation inevitably causes 
temporary slow-downs – i.e. we have long-term benefit at the price of short-term problem. 
However, more recent economic studies show that these short-term problems are not in fact 
inevitable. Reducing fiscal imbalances may contribute to faster growth even in the short 
term. Such an immediate acceleration of economic growth, induced by fiscal contraction, 
and driven by private demand – i.e. driven by businesses and households rather than 
government spending - is called a non-Keynesian effect. 
This paper discusses the effects of fiscal contraction in the new member states from 
Central and Eastern Europe, i.e. Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary. These countries are especially interesting for debates on 
‘fiscal contraction’ - European Union membership and the perspective of joining the euro 
zone mean that these countries must conduct a disciplined fiscal policy. Some of these 
countries have already managed to reduce fiscal imbalances; the others have this ahead of 
them. The experience of the former group is potentially an important lesson for the latter 
countries. However, as of yet, hardly any analysis of the type undertaken in this paper has 
been presented. 
  The paper consists of four main parts.  
In the first part, existing theoretical explanations are systematized, categorised. 
Models explaining non-Keynesian effects can be divided into two groups. (It should be 
stressed, however, that these two explanations are not mutually exclusive.) In the first type 
of explanation, non-Keynesian effects can only occur when a government, facing the 
spectre of a fiscal crisis, decides to reduce budget deficit suddenly. According to this kind 
of explanation, the government’s withdrawal from its prior irresponsible fiscal policy must 
be decisive. This decisiveness makes the public believe in the sincerity of the government’s 
new approach.  Non-Keynesian effects appear – this explanation continues – because the 
previous uncertainty in the public mind about government policy is now dispelled. This 
means that households and businesses start to become more confident about the future; they 
start spending more, and the increase in their expenditure more than compensates for the 
reduction in government-led demand.  
In the second type of explanation, the occurrence of non-Keynesian effects is 
thought to depend on the composition of fiscal contraction rather than on the scale of the 
initial fiscal imbalance. The source of the non-Keynesian effects is said to be the fall in 
enterprises’ costs brought on by reducing government expenditure. As a result, business 
profitability increases, and secondly, their competitiveness on international markets goes 
up. This situation may occur if the initial government deficit is reduced by cutting 
government expenditure on wages and salaries. For this cost-cutting softens wage pressure 
throughout the whole economy, wage expenditure being globally the main cost of 
enterprises.  
In the second part, we briefly review the available empirical research on non-
Keynesian effects. Although those studies taken as a whole are inconclusive in many 
details, there does appear to be an emerging conviction, that these non-Keynesian effects 
are not merely a theoretical curiosity. The specific impact of fiscal contraction on growth 
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can be better and better isolated from the effects of other factors, thanks to the development 
of econometric techniques. Despite that (or rather due to that), new evidence in support of 
non-Keynesian effects occurring is being gathered.     
    In the third and fourth parts, we examine the consequences of tightening fiscal 
policy in selected NMS. By using econometric tools, we find evidence that in the NMS 
fiscal consolidation made economies grow faster already in the short term. However, this 
paper does not unambiguously establish the details of the effects of fiscal contraction on 
private consumption and investment – whether the latter were boosted or restrained. Only 
export behaved strictly in a non-Keynesian way, that is to say, exports started growing 
much faster immediately following consolidation. Next, we carry out qualitative case 
studies of the strongest fiscal adjustments in the countries under consideration. With only 
one exception, such adjustments resulted in immediate improvements of economic 
performance. Cuts in government expenditure, including expenditure on wages and salaries, 
brought about similar results to those implied by the models which suggest that we should 
look for the sources of non-Keynesian effects in the fall of business costs. Those cuts 
contributed to wage moderation. The weakening of wage pressure in turn made exports 
more profitable, and clearly increased businesses’ ability and propensity to invest. The 
deficit reduction, regardless of the method applied, led to a drop in interest rates. The 
governments in question gained credibility, since they were in a better position to pay their 
bills. This situation contributed to the increase of direct foreign investment inflow. The fact 
that the governments of those same countries had not previously enjoyed much credibility 
may partly explain why the non-Keynesian effects occurred in the NMS more often than in 
developed countries – the change was more dramatic. However, this aspect could only have 
played a key role in the mid 90’s. After that, the crucial factor in explaining non-Keynesian 
effects seems to be the focus on expenditure cuts. Nevertheless, economic performance 
during fiscal consolidation may have been partly the effect of strong demand in the main 
trading partners of the New Member States. Even if this was the case, one might still claim 
that in a small open economy a Keynesian response of output to even large fiscal 
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The view that transitory slow-downs in output momentum are an unavoidable 
consequence of tightening fiscal policy has been predominant among economists at least since 
the 1940’s. Many economists have been convinced that an economy can reap longer-term 
benefits from a reduction of the budget deficit only at the cost of a short-term deceleration in 
output growth. However, more recent research shows that reducing fiscal imbalances may 
contribute to faster growth not only in the long term, but in the short run as well.  
This paper is about these kinds of non-Keynesian effects of tightening fiscal policy. 
We analyse new member states (NMS) from Central and Eastern Europe, i.e. Estonia, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary. Our 
motivation for selecting these countries was as follows: European Union membership and the 
perspective of joining the euro zone impose on these countries the requirement of disciplined 
fiscal policy. Some of these countries – Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Slovenia – have 
managed to reduce fiscal imbalances; the others – Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Hungary – have this ahead of them. So the experience of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Slovenia represents an important lesson for the countries in the second group. As far as we are 
aware, hardly any analysis of the type we are undertaking has been conducted. 
  The main part of this paper consists of four sections, numbered from two to five. In 
section two we systematize theoretical explanations of non-Keynesian effects. In section three 
we briefly review previous research on the non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contraction. In 
section four we use panel estimation techniques to examine the consequences of tightening 
fiscal policy in selected NMS. We have said that tightening fiscal policy may influence output 
growth in the short term; we attempt to analyse the channels through which this happens. 
(Previous studies on effects of fiscal contraction in transition economies have focused mostly 
on its persistence (see, e.g., Catriona Purfield, 2003).) In section five we analyse the outcomes 
of strong fiscal adjustments in the countries under consideration - in the case of minor deficit 
reductions, any results could be biased by the impact on deficits of cyclical fluctuations in 
output. However, there are too few cases of strong fiscal adjustment to allow credible 
statistical conclusions to be drawn, so instead we have carried out qualitative case studies. 
(Until now, this is an undeveloped aspect of the literature on non-Keynesian effects in NMS.) 
Having described the size and composition of fiscal consolidation in the various cases, we 
analyse expenditure flows, placing particular stress on the momentum of exports, investment, 
and private consumption during periods where fiscal policy is being tightened.  
  In section six we present the main findings of our analysis.  
 
2. A Short Survey of Existing Theories. 
 
In the Keynesian approach, fiscal contraction is said to reduce aggregate demand and, 
as a result, output. In the simplest case, the negative relationship between aggregate demand 
and fiscal impulses, in the module, is larger than one. A given improvement in fiscal balance 
leads to a decline in aggregate demand that is several times larger. The decline consists of: the 
original reduction of public expenditure (or of private consumption, if the improvement in 
fiscal balance is obtained through tax increases or transfer cuts), plus secondary falls in 
private consumption, resulting from the decreased flow of total income from enterprises to 
households and the allocation by households of a fixed per cent of additional income to 
consumption. One may derive the general definition of non-Keynesian effects from that of 
Keynesian ones: an improvement of fiscal balance is said to lead to a non-Keynesian effect, if 
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This kind of division of the effects of fiscal contraction into the Keynesian and the 
non-Keynesian is imprecise. In using even the simplest textbook Keynesian model (i.e., the 
Samuelson model), one can easily show that fiscal contraction may in certain circumstances 
raise aggregate demand. Since tax and transfer multipliers are smaller than the public 
expenditure multiplier, as far as the modules are concerned, a sufficient condition for an 
increase in aggregate demand is higher taxes or transfer cuts, provided that those additional 
taxes are eased by an adequate increase of public expenditure on goods and services. So it is 
clear that to assess the effects of fiscal contraction, one needs to know about the mechanisms 
that led to them. 
Models explaining non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contraction can be divided into two 
groups. The first group attributes the source non-Keynesian effects to the concerns of private 
agents about government’s solvency. According to models of the second group, these non-
Keynesian effects are caused by positive supply shocks, induced by fiscal impulses.  
  With the first type of explanation, the strength and sign of the relation between 
aggregate demand and fiscal impulses both depend on the expectations of private agents. In 
the aftermath of fiscal contraction, households may reach the conclusion that they have had 
over-pessimistic expectations as to the course of public expenditure and cumulated tax 
burdens (factors which influence the distribution of income between consumption and 
savings). In that case, adjustment of these expectations may result in an increase in private 
expenditure that more than offsets the direct negative impact of fiscal adjustment on aggregate 
demand. The sign of the relationship between aggregate demand and negative fiscal impulse 
will be positive, if, in the opinion of households, a reduction of the budget deficit 
considerably raises the cumulated flow of disposable income in their horizon of utility 
maximization. This will happen if fiscal consolidation in the current period allows the 
avoidance of a major increase of taxation in the future. (Such a major taxation increase, by 
inducing serious distortions, could lead to a permanent drop in output.)   
  The foregoing argument would suggest that the occurrence of non-Keynesian effects 
of fiscal contraction is more likely where public debt is high and growing. In such 
circumstances, households are more likely to expect that they will soon be burdened with the 
repayment of a part of the debt accumulated by previous generations – they are aware that 
public debt cannot increase endlessly (see e. g. Alan Sutherland, 1995). On the other hand, 
when public debt is high and rising, a rise in taxation to a level causing serious distortions is 
more and more likely (see, e.g. Olivier J. Blanchard, 1990). A sufficiently large reduction in 
fiscal deficit would dispel both of these fears
3.  
  So fiscal impulses may lead to non-Keynesian effects because of their impact on the 
flow of disposable income expected by households in a horizon of utility maximization. 
However, fiscal impulses may also lead to non-Keynesian effects because of their influence 
on interest rates and, thus, on interest rate-sensitive private expenditure –this influence being 
stronger than predicted in the standard Keynesian approach (with regard to the latter see e.g. 
John R. Hicks, 1937). With public debt, there is always the risk that the government will 
attempt to decrease its real value with higher inflation, or that the government will become 
                                                 
3 Conversely, increase in fiscal deficit, by accelerating the pace at which public debt grows, hastens the moment when fiscal policy must be 
changed, thus strengthening pessimistic expectations of households.  
The influence of fiscal policy on aggregate demand may also depend on the level of the ratio of public expenditure to output. If the ratio is 
low, then the increase of public expenditure is – to a considerable degree – offset by the decrease of private consumption, because 
households are aware that the government is unlikely to cut public expenditure until its financing becomes a problem, and thus, they consider 
the increase to be permanent. Each subsequent increase of government spending leads to an ever weaker decrease of private consumption 
and, in effect, a stronger increase in aggregate demand because the higher the level of current expenditure, the greater the proportion of 
households thinking that the increase of public expenditure is temporary. If public expenditure exceeds a certain threshold - and despite this 
is not reduced - households cease to believe in the temporary nature of its previous increase. As the value of the cumulated tax burden 
expected by households goes up sharply, households considerably reduce their consumption. In effect, the increase of public expenditure is 
associated with a decrease of aggregate demand (see, for example: Giuseppe Bertola and Allan Drazen, 1993). Thus, the failure to reduce the 
budget deficit may, if announced, result in a sharp fall in private consumption, leading to a decrease in aggregate demand. 
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the state of public finances gives rise to the concern of economic agents, reduction of fiscal 
deficit, by substantially decreasing the previously high currency and country risk premium, 
may crowd in private expenditure (which is sensitive to changes in interest rates) much more 
strongly than in ‘normal’ times (see, for example: Marcus Miller, Robert Skidelsky and Paul 
Weller, 1990).  
   Let us now turn our attention to the second type of explanation for non-Keynesian 
effects. Fiscal impulses may cause supply shocks which lead to changes in output, because of 
the impact of fiscal impulses on the level of real wages. This kind of supply shock spills over 
into the economy more quickly than other kinds of supply shock as it is more easily perceived 
by economic agents, thus influencing their decisions more directly.  
  Generally speaking, the sign of the shock caused by the reduction of fiscal deficit 
cannot be unambiguously determined. It depends on the way fiscal policy is tightened. Deficit 
can be reduced either by cuts in spending or through tax increases. Reducing expenditure, 
particularly on wages and salaries, softens wage pressure in the whole economy, while higher 
taxes increase the pressure. Wage expenditure constitutes the main cost of enterprises en 
masse. A fall in real wage dynamics increases the price competitiveness of businesses on the 
international market. The more open the economy, the more important the wage dynamics for 
the economic performance of country in question. Strengthened wage discipline may also 
raise enterprises’ profits, profits which affect both their capacity and their propensity
4 to 
invest. Accelerating wage momentum has precisely opposite effects.  
  It follows that a reduction in deficit, depending on how it is introduced, could either 
raise, or lower domestic business profitability and domestic business competitiveness on 
international markets. The increase in competitiveness occurs if the deficit is reduced by 
curtailing expenditure on wages and salaries, and the opposite happens if taxes are raised. All 
this means that, in regard to the short-term impact of fiscal impulses on output, they should 
have a composition exactly opposite to that suggested by the standard Keynesian approach 
(see, for example: Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, Roberto Perotti, Fabio Schiantarelli, 1999, 
Philip Lane, Roberto Perotti, 2001).  
To summarize: according to the first explanation, non-Keynesian effects should occur 
only if a government, facing the spectre of a fiscal crisis, decides to introduce credible fiscal 
consolidation - consolidation strong enough to stop the growth of public debt. The origin of 
the non-Keynesian effects in this view is the dispelling of the uncertainty left in the public 
mind by the government’s previous policy. Such an explanation can be called quasi-
Keynesian, since, on the one hand, it is close to Keynes’ conviction (1936, chapters 5 and 12) 
about the role played by the changing expectations of private agents in causing fluctuations in 
aggregate demand, and, on the other hand, those effects are only deemed likely in the case of 
deep initial fiscal imbalance. 
In the second type of explanation, the occurrence of non-Keynesian effects depends on 
the composition of the fiscal contraction rather than on the scale of the initial fiscal 
imbalance. The source of the non-Keynesian effects is positive supply shock, whose nature is 
exclusively determined by the manner in which current fiscal policy is tightened - not by the 
manner in which it was conducted in the past.  
However, we should point out that these kinds of explanation are not mutually 
exclusive - the various mechanisms described in them seem to be independent of each other. 
In that sense, contrary to what is sometimes stated in the literature (see, for example: 
Francesco Giavazzi, Tullio Jappelli, Marco Pagano, 2000), the different views are not 
competing, but complementary.   
                                                 
4 A fall in real wage dynamics raises (ceteris paribus) capital remuneration, but has no impact on depreciation of capital. Thus, the increase 
in capital remuneration is tantamount to a rise of rate of return from investment. 
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Diagram 1. Types of Explanation of Non-Keynesian Effects of Fiscal Contraction 
 
 
At the end of this section it seems worth remarking that non-Keynesian effects of fiscal 
contraction may be easily shown using the slightly modified textbook IS-LM model (see, for 
example: William Silber, 1970, Gregory N. Mankiw and Lawrence H. Summers, 1984, 
Andrzej  Rzońca, 2005a, 2005b), which itself has to a large extent contributed to the spread of 
the belief that the only possible change of output during fiscal consolidation is its decline.  
 
3. Review of Previous Empirical Studies. 
 
The experience of Denmark in 1983-1986 and Ireland in 1987-1989 fuelled research 
on circumstances where a reduction in public spending or a rise in taxes leads to a growth in 
output - even in the short term. The experience of these two countries was thoroughly 
analysed in the seminal paper of Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano (1990). Many more 
episodes of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contraction have since been identified
5 and 
discussed. Still, case studies have usually been treated as a mere starting point for research 
into those effects. The next step - analysis of the experience of a wide group of countries – 
has, however, been taken. At first, this analysis came down to the quoting of descriptive 
                                                 
5 Inter alia: in Italy in 1976-1977, in Sweden in 1984-1987 and 1994-1997, in Canada in 1993-1997, in the United Kingdom in 1994-1997, 
and in Spain in 1996-1997; see e.g. Göran Hjelm (2002). 
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models, if presented, focused on the issue of the persistence of fiscal adjustment (see e.g. John 
McDermott and Robert F. Wescott, 1996). Gradually, more emphasis was put on estimating 
private consumption or investment equations - so researchers were able to determine, 
quantitatively, the channels through which fiscal tightening leads to non-Keynesian effects. In 
most cases single equations, constructed on an ad hoc basis, were estimated
6 (e.g. Francesco 
Giavazzi, Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pagano, 1999), but the multi-equation approach, in the 
form of the structural VAR framework, has also been applied (e.g. Roberto Perotti, 2002).   
One can draw the following conclusions from the empirical studies on non-Keynesian 
effects of fiscal contraction.  
•  Episodes of fiscal tightening are very often accompanied by an acceleration of output 
momentum. This acceleration is driven by both private consumption and investment. 
However, the latter’s growth rate increases much more than that of the former (see, for 
example: Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti and Jose Tavares, 1998). The acceleration of 
investment momentum is preceded by an increase in the share of capital remuneration in 
output (see e.g. Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna, 1998).  
•  Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contraction are more plausible in open economies rather 
than in closed ones (see, for example: Richard Hemming, Selma Mahfouz and Axel 
Schimmelpfennig, 2002).  
•  Non-Keynesian effects occur mainly when the external economic situation is favorable 
(e.g. John McDermott and Robert F. Wescott, 1996). However, an unfavorable domestic 
economic situation in the period preceding fiscal adjustment, does not present an obstacle 
for the occurrence of these effects (e.g. Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, 1996).   
•  It follows from most studies that non-Keynesian effects occur more often when fiscal 
adjustment is lasting (see, for example: Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, 1996) and 
large (e.g. Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano, 1996). Some of those studies point out 
that the probability of the effects’ occurrence is greater when public debt is high (Rina 
Bhattacharya, 1999) or fast growing (see, for example: Francesco Giavazzi, Tullio 
Jappelli and Marco Pagano, 2000), rather than low and, at most, slowly growing.     
•  Fiscal adjustments are more lasting and lead more often to non-Keynesian effects if they 
are caused rather by curtailment of expenditure than by tax increases (see e.g. Alberto 
Alesina, Roberto Perotti and Jose Tavares, 1998). Some studies show an opposite 
relationship, but they mainly concern the reaction of private consumption to negative 
fiscal impulses (see e.g. Francesco Giavazzi, Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pagano, 1999). 
•  The manner of fiscal policy tightening is of far greater importance in terms of its 
aftermath than the scale of deficit reduction. Among successful fiscal adjustments, those 
that focus on cuts in public sector wage expenditure and in transfers to households are 
particularly frequent (see, for example: Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, Roberto Perotti 
and Fabio Schiantarelli, 1999).      
In closing this section it should be nevertheless emphasized: none of the 
aforementioned studies considers the acceleration of output as a result of fiscal tightening to 
be certain. In the literature, the view still prevails that a Keynesian reaction of output to 
budget deficit reduction is more plausible than a non-Keynesian one. But then that reaction is 
at most of modest scale. Most empirical studies on the effectiveness of fiscal policy in 
stimulating aggregate demand show that the tax multiplier hardly exceeds one half and that of 
public expenditure hardly exceeds one (Richard Hemming, Michael Kell and Selma Mahfouz, 
2002).       
                                                 
6 That and other weaknesses of empirical studies on non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contraction are discussed, inter alia, in Richard 
Hemming, Michael Kell and Selma Mahfouz (2002, pp. 25-26)  
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4. Econometric Analysis. 
 
In this section we used panel data estimation techniques to verify whether fiscal 
policies in New Member States
7 in 1993-2002 produced non-Keynesian effects.  First, we 
briefly describe the methods we used to obtain measures of discretionary fiscal policy. Then 
we present the data, the specification of the equations and estimation techniques used. Finally 
we provide results of the estimation.  
 
4.1. Fiscal Impulses. 
 
To evaluate the effects of fiscal policy on the economy in question, one should 
separate the discretionary changes in this policy from those caused by changing 
macroeconomic variables. For this reason we focused first on the primary aspects of a fiscal 
policy stance, such as primary balance and primary expenditure, since fluctuations of interest 
payments cannot be considered discretionary (Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti, 1996).  
Secondly, we tried to apply one of the available cyclical correction methods. There are 
at least three possibilities. The first approach - proposed, for example, by the OECD - relies 
on calculating cyclically adjusted fiscal variables. However, this method cannot be used in the 
case of states subject to our analysis because these countries have completed at most one 
business cycle since the beginning of their transition, so there are no reliable measurements of 
either elasticity of fiscal aggregates, or of potential output. Both these measures are required 
to apply the proposed method. The second available method is a procedure proposed by 
Oliver Blanchard (1993). One of the most important conditions for the reliability of impulses 
computed in this manner is a good fit of the equation estimated. Unfortunately, in almost all 
the countries in question, we failed to find relations which would show a sufficient degree of 
precision. Because of the above-mentioned problems, we used a third method, which is a 
simplified version of the growth-accounting approach proposed by Jurgen von Hagen (2002)
8.  
The fiscal impulse calculated in this manner indicates what the growth of the ratio of a given 
fiscal variable over GDP would be, if GDP was at the same level as during the previous 




We used panel data for New Member States (i.e., the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) in the period from 1993 to 2002. 
We used data from IMF’s Government Finance Statistics. This publication contains detailed 
fiscal data for the above-mentioned states and includes all government sectors. The national 
accounts data (such as real growth of GDP, exports, imports, private consumption and private 
investment) were taken from the European Commission’s AMECO database, and the data 
concerning real effective exchange rates and interest rates - from the Economist Intelligence 
Unit database. The data do not cover the whole period for all countries; hence the estimated 
models are based on an unbalanced panel.  
 
                                                 
7 Malta and Cyprus were excluded from the estimation. 
8 This method was applied in paper by Jurgen von Hagen and Iulia Traistaru (2004) for computing fiscal impulses in New Member States.  
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To find possible evidence of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy tightening in 
selected countries, we first estimated the effects of fiscal impulses caused by changes in 
general government balances on GDP growth. We used a simple empirical specification
9 
relating the real GDP growth rate to primary deficit impulses (current and lagged). We also 
included lagged real GDP growth in order to capture the conventional persistence of this 
variable caused by the business cycle. We also control the effects of changes in the levels of 
exchange and interest rates. Hence, the estimated equation based on cross-country time-series 























1 1 _ _ γ ϕ β δ µ , it i it u ε α + =  (4.1) 
where gdp is real GDP growth, def_imp - fiscal impulse resulting from changes in primary 
deficit, reer  - real effective exchange rate (based on CPI), r_m - real money market interest 
rate
11,  i α represents a time-invariant country-specific disturbance (individual effect) and it ε  is 
random noise. According to the theoretical assumptions described in Section two of this 
paper, non-Keynesian effects in the analyzed economies should appear in output expansions 
(or contractions) when fiscal policy is tightened (loosened). This means that in equation (4.1) 
at least one of the estimated coefficients  k β  should be positive and statistically significant
12.  
As the next step, we tried to identify the channels through which non-Keynesian 
effects occur. Firstly, we tried to confirm the existence of the export channel. If it really does 
operate, the reduction in fiscal deficit obtained by cuts in expenditure should boost exports 
more than a reduction obtained by tax increases, as described in Section two. To verify this 
relationship, we first computed the contribution of the expenditure impulse to the fiscal deficit 
impulse. Then we defined an artificial variable, which is equal to 1 if the contribution is 
greater then 50% and 0 otherwise. Using this variable we estimated the following equation: 
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ϕ           ( 4 . 2 )  
where exp is real growth of exports in NMS and imp_eu is real growth of imports in the EU 
(other variables as in (4.1)). We added real effective exchange rate, real growth of imports in 
the EU and real growth of GDP in NMS in order to control for the most important 
determinants of the growth of exports. If an export channel exists, parameters of at least one 
of the pairs (e.g. 1 β and  1 λ  or  2 β and  2 λ ) should be positive and statistically significant. Such 
values of the parameters would indicate that the composition of the fiscal impulse matters for 
the occurrence of non-Keynesian effects. 
                                                 
9 We realize that the models presented in this subsection could be considered oversimplified. However, the short time dimension of the 
analyzed panel prevents us from using more sophisticated methods such as, for example, panel VAR models.  
10 We fixed the maximum lag of variables at 1 because of the short time dimension of the panel.  
11 We used the money market rate (instead of deposit or lending rate) to take into account the effect of deposit rate on consumption and the 
effect of the lending rate on investment. The use of deposit or lending rate does not change the results considerably. 
12 In this section we defined fiscal impulse caused by adjustment of the primary deficit as positive, if there was a reduction in the deficit or an 
increase in the surplus level. 
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Secondly, we examined the existence of the private investment channel.  Also in this 
case, as described in section two, the composition of the fiscal impulse is crucial.  To verify 
this channel we used the same artificial variable (ex_def_ratio) as in the case of the export 





























1 _ _ _ _ γ λ β δ κ µ    (4.3)     
where pinv is real growth of private investment and r_l – real lending rate (other variables as 
in (4.1)). We used the real lending rate to control the effects of changes in the user’s cost of 
capital on the investment dynamics. If an investment channel does really operate, parameters 
of at least one of the pairs (e.g. 1 β and  1 λ  or  2 β and  2 λ ) should be positive and statistically 
significant. 






























1 _ _ _ _ γ λ β δ γ µ   (4.4) 
where pcon is real growth of private consumption, r_d is real deposit rate (included to control 
the impact of the higher revenues from private savings on current private consumption) and 
def_imp_art is an artificial variable, which equals def_imp if the fiscal impulse caused by 
change in the primary deficit is large
13 and 0 in other cases (other variables as in (4.1.)). We 
decided on such specifications since - as is well known from the theory - changes in 
households’ savings should offset changes in government savings only if the latter are 
considered permanent. As shown in previous empirical studies (see section three), households 
are more likely to consider fiscal adjustments to be permanent, if their scale is large enough.  
Hence, in the case of the existence of a consumption channel, the estimated parameters at 
least for one k (where k=1 or 2) should be statistically significant and fulfill the following 
subset of conditions:  
•  0 < k β  and  
•  0 > k λ and 
•  k k λ β <  . 
 
4.4. Methodological Issues. 
 
The estimation of equations (4.1), (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4) based on the described panel 
could cause severe problems. First of all, in the case of dynamic panel data models with a 
lagged dependent variable, basic estimators like pooled (OLS), fixed effects (FE), or random 
effects (RE) are biased. Secondly, this specification could be affected by the endogeneity of 
the regressors. In this situation the standard approach is to use either the GMM estimator 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) – the so-called difference estimator, or the estomator 
proposed in Arellano and Bover (1995) – the so-called system estimator. Both require an 
instrumental variables’ procedure with the instruments usually being second- and higher-order 
lags of endogenous variables. Those estimators cannot be used in our panel due to the lack of 
a sufficient number of observations
14.  
                                                 
13 We have adopted the definition used in von Hagen and Traistaru (2004). According to this definition, large expansions (contractions) mean 
that the general government budget deficit increased (or fell) by at least 1.0 percent of GDP in one year, or 1.5 percent in two consecutive 
years. In the econometric part of the analysis we did not use the stricter conditions applied in other research works concerning developed 
countries, due to the lack of a sufficient number of observations fulfilling those conditions.  
14 Because GMM estimators have an asymptotical character, they exhibit severe bias in the case of small samples.  
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heterogeneity of the estimated parameters. If the estimated parameters were indeed 
heterogeneous, the estimated coefficient would vary across countries and, for instance, instead 






















1 _ _ γ ϕ β δ µ                (4.5) 
If the time dimension of the panel were large enough, the standard approach would be a 
separate estimation of the model for each country by OLS and averaging of the parameters 
obtained in such a way
15. 
   The fourth problem that could affect our results is a possible panel-level (or group) 
heterogeneity and a contemporaneous correlation of error terms. In the model analyzed this is 
equivalent to the assumption that there is a connection between individual states in the range 
of effects not included in the model. If such an assumption were true, the model can be 
estimated using the OLS estimator with the panel corrected standard errors proposed by Beck 
and Katz (1995). In our models we use the Prais-Winsten transformed regression estimator for 
additional correction of the first-order serial-correlation of the residuals.   
Taking into account all the above-mentioned restrictions, we analyzed relations we 
have formulated using four types of panel data estimators: pooled (OLS), fixed effects (FE), 
random effects (RE), and Prais-Winsten with panel corrected standard errors (PW-PCSE). At 
the same time, we do realize that the obtained results could be affected by some of the above-
mentioned problems and that conclusions drawn on their basis should be taken with caution.  
 
4.5. Results of the Estimation. 
  
Using the data and the empirical specifications described above, we first estimated the 
impact of discretionary changes in the fiscal deficit on GDP growth. Table 1 presents various 
pooled estimates of equation (4.1).
16 For each type of the estimators used we received similar 
values of the estimated coefficients
17. The impact of current impulses of the fiscal deficit is in 
all cases positive and statistically significant, which confirms the appearance of non-
Keynesian effects. The estimated coefficients indicate that a discretionary reduction in fiscal 
deficit by 1% of the GDP raises the output momentum rate by about 0.50 p.p. The estimated 
coefficients on control variables are highly significant, regardless of the type of estimator 
used.    
                                                 
15 This estimator is called the Mean Group estimator and was first proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995).   
16 We present only the final results e.g. after excluding insignificant variables from initial specification. 
17 There are two common features of results presented in this subsection. Firstly, in all of the estimated specifications, tests for the individual 
effects (in random and fixed effects models) indicate that models should be estimated using OLS. Secondly, the results obtained using the 
random effects estimator are, almost in all cases, equal to the results using the OLS estimator, which indicates that the estimated variance of 
the individual effects is close to 0 (see e.g. Baltagi, 2003, p.18).  For these reasons we treat the results obtained using OLS and PW-PCSE as 
the most appropriate.  
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Table 1. The Effects of Fiscal Deficit Impulses on GDP Growth. 
   OLS FE RE  PW-PCSE 
      
gdpt-1  0.3411** 0.3057** 0.3411** 0.2909** 
  (0.0728) (0.0849) (0.0728) (0.1033) 
      
r_mt   -0.0678**   -0.0876**   -0.0678**  -0.0806** 
  (0.0293) (0.0360) (0.0293) (0.0263) 
      
def_impt  0.5174** 0.4879** 0.5174** 0.5315** 
  (0.1326) (0.1380) (0.1326) (0.1310) 
      
const  3.6988** 4.0474** 3.6988** 4.0930** 
  (0.5786) (0.6934) (0.5786) (0.6152) 
              
R
2  0.5008 0.4960 0.5008 0.6467 
Wald test for joint significance (p-value)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wald test for joint significance of fixed effects 
(p-value)  NA 0.8098 NA  NA 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for 
random effects (p-value)  NA NA  0.3049  NA 
Number of observations  66 66 66 66 
 
Next, we tried to verify the channels through which non-Keynesian effects operate. 
Firstly, we used equation (4.2) in order to examine the export channel. The results we 
obtained (see table.2) confirm the existence of the export channel: as expected, the 
coefficients on current def_imp and ex_def_ratio variables are both positive and statistically 
significant. The sign and value of the parameter on ex_def_ratio variable indicate that the 
composition of the fiscal impulse has significant impact on the growth of exports. 
Furthermore, the signs and values of the coefficients on control variables are consistent with 
the theory.  
 
Table 2. The Export Channel. 
   OLS FE RE  PW-PCSE 
      
expt-1  0.3571** 0.1792 0.3571**  0.3724** 
  (0.1403) (0.1675) (0.1403) (0.1358) 
      
imp_eut  1.3195** 1.1150** 1.3195** 1.2201** 
  (0.3255) (0.3383) (0.3255) (0.3669) 
      
imp_eut-1  -1.1955** -1.0443** -1.1956**  -0.9202* 
  (0.4018) (0.4082) (0.4018) (0.5517) 
      
gdpt-1  -0.8431* -0.4709 -0.8431*  -0.8135** 
  (0.4774) (0.5514) (0.4774) (0.3540) 
      
def_impt  3.3587** 3.4178** 3.3587** 3.2675** 
  (0.5871) (0.5959) (0.5871) (0.4548) 
      
ex_def_ratiot  3.8819 2.9062 3.8819  4.0386** 
  (2.4941) (2.6344) (2.4941) (1.7557) 
      
const  7.4380* 7.9827* 7.4380*  5.8856 
  (4.1849) (4.2064) (4.1849) (4.6266) 
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R
2  0.5345 0.5187 0.5345 0.5696 
Wald test for joint significance (p-value)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wald test for joint significance of fixed effects 
(p-value)  NA 0.4043 NA  NA 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for 
random effects (p-value)  NA NA  0.7503  NA 
Number of observations  59 59 59 59 
 
Secondly, using the empirical specification given by equation (4.3), we attempted to 
examine the potential investment channel. The results of the estimation (see table.3) indicate 
that discretionary changes in the fiscal deficit have no significant impact on private 
investment growth, regardless of the estimator used. The same applies to the artificial variable 
exp_def_ratio, which indicates fiscal adjustments dominated by changes in government 
expenditure: the values of the parameters differ substantially depending on the estimator used. 
The estimates of current GDP growth are significant and, in accordance with the conventional 
accelerator effect, act positively on dependent variables. 
 
 
Table 3. The Investment Channel. 
   OLS FE RE  PW-PCSE 
      
gdpt  2.9209** 2.6496** 2.9209** 2.8251** 
  (0.6174) (0.6848) (0.6174) (0.7568) 
      
def_impt  0.7186 0.9011 0.7186 0.5476 
  (0.8265) (0.8587) (0.8265) (0.6931) 
      
ex_def_ratiot  0.2618 1.6385 0.2618 -0.3078 
  (3.3715) (3.6421) (3.3715) (2.4194) 
      
const  -2.5477 -2.3112 -2.5477 -1.7799 
  (3.6103) (3.8523) (3.6103) (2.9983) 
              
R
2  0.3205 0.3180 0.3205 0.3624 
Wald test for joint significance (p-value)  0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 
Wald test for joint significance of fixed effects 
(p-value)  NA 0.6836 NA  NA 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for 
random effects (p-value)  NA NA  0.3287  NA 
Number of observations  63 63 63 63 
 
   
Finally, we estimated equation (4.4) in order to find evidence of a consumption 
channel for non-Keynesian effects. The estimates presented in table 4 indicate that current 
discretionary changes in fiscal deficit have a negative and (only in one case) significant 
impact on private consumption growth, as predicted by the Keynesian theory. The claim that 
this impact can be offset by a non-Keynesian reaction of households finds at most mixed 
evidence in the obtained results. The coefficients on the current variable def_art possess a 
sign consistent with the theory according to which sufficiently large fiscal adjustments have a 
positive impact on the growth of private consumption. However, the values of the estimated 
parameters are slightly smaller than the corresponding absolute values of the coefficients on 
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current fiscal deficit impulses. In addition, the significance of the estimates depends on the 
type of the estimator used.     
 
Table 4. The Consumption Channel.  
   OLS FE RE  PW-PCSE 
      
pcont-1  0.1280 0.1423 0.1283 0.0629 
  (0.1032) (0.1113) (0.1034) (0.0930) 
      
gdpt  0.8230** 0.8970** 0.8323** 0.8056** 
  (0.1656) (0.1854) (0.1671) (0.1137) 
      
r_dt  -0.1217** -0.1827** -0.1262**  -0.0906 
  (0.0541) (0.0837) (0.0569) (0.0571) 
      
def_impt  -1.1383 -0.9887 -1.1200 -0.8887* 
  (0.8800) (0.9219) (0.8774) (0.5018) 
      
def_imp_artt  0.9302 0.7977 0.9133 0.7129* 
  (0.8790) (0.9198) (0.8764) (0.3675) 
      
const  1.3022 1.5635 1.3051  1.4851** 
  (0.9438) (1.1395) (0.9747) (0.7248) 
              
R
2  0.4403 0.4415 0.4477 0.4271 
Wald test for joint significance (p-value)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wald test for joint significance of fixed effects 
(p-value)  NA 0.6859 NA  NA 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for 
random effects (p-value)  NA NA  0.3270  NA 
Number of observations  60 60 60 60 
 
 
To sum up, the estimated models provide mixed evidence of non-Keynesian effects in 
the countries analyzed. On the one hand, we found that discretionary fiscal impulses 
contributed substantially to the acceleration of output growth even in the short run. On the 
other hand, we identified unambiguously only one of the channels through which non-
Keynesian effects occur, i.e. the export channel.  We found also some evidence confirming 
the existence of a consumption channel, but no evidence in the case of an investment channel.    
One of the possible reasons for these results are the problems caused by the 
insufficient number of observations (some of those problems are described in subsection 4.4). 
These problems could also have affected the results we obtained which confirmed the 
existence of non-Keynesian effects. This situation induced us to conduct more detailed 
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The research findings presented in this section concern episodes of strong fiscal 
contraction. The scope of the analysis has been narrowed because considering only major 
fiscal tightening limits the risk that the findings will be biased by the impact of cyclical 
fluctuations in output on the deficit; that is to say, that the causal chain runs not from the 
reduction of the deficit to a growth in output, but rather from a growth in output to a reduction 
of the deficit.  
    Some arbitrary decisions are unavoidable when defining episodes of strong fiscal 
adjustment. In this section such episodes are considered to be periods during which the 
primary structural balance or the primary balance of the general government improved 
respectively by at least 1.5% and 2% of GDP within one year or 1.25% and 1.5% of GDP on 
average over a period of two years. Similar thresholds were assumed by, e.g., Alberto Alesina 
and Roberto Perotti (1996), and Catriona Purfield (2003) for primary structural balance and 
primary balance respectively.  
    We analyzed data both on a cash and on an accrual basis, before making the final 
decision whether to consider an episode a strong one or not. The objective of reviewing data 
from different sources
18 and on the basis of different definitions was twofold. On the one 
hand, we wanted to avoid describing episodes of fiscal consolidation that in fact had not 
occurred. On the other hand, we wanted to avoid omitting any period of strong fiscal 
adjustment. In the case of transition economies, the risk of such mistakes was rather high 
because of incessant changes in definition of general government. 
Ten episodes meet the aforementioned definition. They took place in the Czech 
Republic in 1993, in Poland in 1993, in Slovakia in 1993-1995, in Hungary in 1995-1996, in 
Lithuania in 1997 and in 2000, in Estonia in 1997 and in 2000-2001, and in Latvia in 1996-
1997 and 2000-2001. They were too few to allow us to draw credible statistical conclusions. 
So we decided instead to carry out qualitative case studies.  
We omitted the first three episodes, i.e., those that occurred in the Czech Republic in 
1993, in Poland in 1993, and in Slovakia in 1993-1995. The decision to take only the 7 other 
episodes into consideration was driven by the following two premises. First, we were 
constrained by data availability. It is hard to find detailed data of sufficient quality covering 
the beginning of the transition period. Secondly, the analysed countries experienced a lot of 
shocks, which make it hard to isolate from other factors the impact of fiscal policy tightening 
on output momentum in the short term. For later episodes of strong fiscal adjustment, that 
problem has not disappeared, but any possible bias resulting from it has become much less 
significant. It should be remarked, however, that such an omission is of no importance for the 
general conclusion of the analysis, since in all the excluded cases, output followed the same 
qualitative path as in the remaining cases (if taken as a whole). A year before fiscal 
consolidation the GDP momentum amounted to -3.3% in the Czech Republic, 2.5% in Poland 
and -6.1% in Slovakia; during the adjustment it came to 0.6, 3.7, and 6.1%, and in the two-
year period following fiscal consolidation to 4.3, 6.1, and 5.7% respectively
19.       
Let’s get down to the central point of the analysis.  
During the period of fiscal adjustments under discussion, general government primary 
balance in each year improved, on average
20, by 2.7% or 3.1%  of GDP on an accrual and 
                                                 
18 For the purpose of the analysis in this section we used data from the following sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Eurostat, the 
International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics Database and Government Financial Statistics Database), the OECD 
(Economic Outlook Database, Main Economic Indicators Database, Structural Analysis Database and Revenue Statistics Database), the 
World Bank (World Development Indicators Database), and the web pages of statistical offices, ministries of finance, and the central banks 
of the countries under discussion. 
19 In these three cases one cannot exclude, however, that the output momentum acceleration was driven by mechanisms other than non-
Keynesian ones. 
20 All means in this section are arithmetic. 
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cash basis respectively. The contribution of a cyclical component to the improvement ranged 
from a negative contribution in the case of Hungary to 1.0-1.6% of GDP in the case of Estonia 
in 2000-2001
21. Hence, the size of the adjustments (for the majority of the episodes 
mentioned) by far exceeded the threshold separating strong ones from minor ones. This 
feature, in light of previous empirical studies, increased the probability that they would induce 
non-Keynesian effects. Firstly, the strength of the deficit reduction is an indication of the 
government’s determination to permanently improve situation in public finances. The more 
convinced are households that the improvement is irreversible, the more efficiently is the 
direct impact of fiscal impulse on aggregate demand neutralized by changes of the opposite 
sign in private expenditure. Secondly, fiscal impulse can have an impact not only on output, 
but on prices as well. The stronger the shock, the more likely is the latter effect. The effect on 
prices alleviates the effect on output, if the output effect is Keynesian. In an open economy 
the price effect is even able to reverse the sign of the output effect to a non-Keynesian one.  
In four of the seven cases under consideration, the improvement of fiscal stance 
resulted solely from a fall in the public expenditure to GDP ratio. That ratio fell in Hungary in 
1995-1996, in Lithuania in 2000, and in Estonia and Latvia in 2000-2001. In Lithuania, public 
expenditure was at that time curbed even in nominal terms – by almost 9%. In Hungary, 
Estonia, and Latvia it was cut, but in real terms, by 12.0, 2.1 and 1.8% respectively
22.  In one 
case out of the other three, i.e. in the case of Estonia in 1997, the improvement of fiscal stance 
was mainly due to a curtailment of public expenditure. In the two remaining cases, the 
exclusive source of fiscal tightening was a rise in taxes. This type of fiscal consolidation took 
place in Latvia in 1996-1997
23, and in Lithuania in 1997.  All in all, the composition of the 
fiscal policy tightening was, in general, conducive to the occurrence of non-Keynesian effects. 
A more detailed examination of the composition of the tightening confirms that conclusion.  
In six out of the seven cases, the fiscal consolidation program contained measures 
aimed at lowering the momentum of public expenditure on wages and salaries below the GDP 
growth rate. The relation of that category of spending to GDP did not fall only in Latvia in 
1996-1997. Curtailment of transfers to households was as much a part of these fiscal 
consolidation programs as the cuts in expenditure on wages and salaries. The ratio of these 
transfers to GDP was not reduced only in Lithuania in 1997. In all cases, the fiscal adjustment 
plan included cuts in subsidies to enterprises.  
The curtailment of these three categories of spending softened the wage pressures in 
the economy. Cuts in public expenditure on wages and salaries, and in transfers weakened the 
position of employees in wage bargaining. The former lowered the opportunity cost of 
working in the private sector instead of working in the state sector, while the latter reduced 
the profitability of staying away from work altogether. And subsidy reductions made 
enterprise budget constraints more rigid, forcing enterprises to be tougher in wage 
negotiations.  
At the same time, the difficult situation on the labour market facilitated the 
preservation of wage discipline in enterprises. A year before fiscal consolidation, the 
unemployment rate was, on average, 13.4%. During the tightening of fiscal policy, it rose 
further in Lithuania in 2000, in Estonia in 2000, and in Latvia in 1996 and 2000.   
Employment was falling. A year before fiscal adjustment it declined in Hungary, in Estonia 
and Latvia, on average, by 4.6%. In Lithuania it increased before the first adjustment, and 
slightly decreased before the second one. However, in Lithuania, as opposed to other 
                                                 
21 We didn’t manage to find the time series of structural balance for Latvia. Data for Estonia are quoted following Rasmus Kattai et al (2003), 
for Hungary – following Gabor P. Kiss and Gabor Vadas (2004), and for Lithuania – following Violette Klyviene (2003).  
22 Data for Hungary are on an accrual basis. For other countries, they are on a cash basis. In the case of Latvia, the real drop of public 
expenditure on an accrual basis was even deeper and, in total, came to 2,4%.  
23 In the case of Latvia in 1996-1997, the picture of fiscal tightening is quite opposite to the one presented above, if one takes into 
consideration data on an accrual basis. Then it would appear to have been driven mainly by public expenditure curtailment. Public 
expenditure to GDP ratio dropped by 3.5 p.p., and the revenue to GDP ratio increased by 0.4 p.p.  
20
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 519
September 2005countries, employment momentum worsened during the consolidation. It fell from 0.9% to 
0.6% and from -0.5% to -3.7% respectively. 
 
Table 5. The Size and Composition of Fiscal Adjustments (in % of GDP). 
   Hungary  Lithuania  Estonia  Latvia 
    1995-96  1997  2000  1997  2000-01 1996-97 2000-01 
on accrual basis  8.2  2.3 3.3  3.8  2.9 3.5 4.0  Size of improvement of 
primary balance  on cash basis  7.1  2.7  5.9  4.1  4.9 3.9 1.8 
             
Change  in  revenue  -4.0 3.0 -1.4  1.7  -0.7 4.1 -4.8 
             
Change in expenditure  -10.2  1.2  -5.0  -2.5  -5.7  0.2  -6.4 
             
Change in expenditure on wages and salaries  -2.9  -0.9  -0.5  -0.6  -0.6    -1.1 
             
Change in transfers to households  -4.4   -0.3 
24
  -0.3  -0.8 -4.2 -3.5 
             
Change in subsidies to enterprises  -1.0  -0.5  -0.2  -0.6  -0.6  -0.2  -0.8 
             
M e m o :            
Unemployment rate before consolidation (in %)  11.0  16.4
25
  14.1  10.0  12.3 18.9 14.4 
            
Employment momentum before consolidation  
(in %)  -3.4 0.9 -0.5  -3,0  -4.4  -10.4  -1.8 
In six out of the seven episodes of fiscal adjustment, output changed in the opposite 
direction than a Keynesian approach would predict, that is to say, one observed an 
acceleration in output momentum in comparison with the previous period instead of its 
slowdown. GDP growth was, on average, faster by 4.9 and 4.2 during and a year after 
consolidation respectively, than a year before fiscal adjustment. Moreover, actual GDP 
momentum during tightening of fiscal policy was almost twice as strong as generally expected 
at the onset of fiscal adjustment, although forecasts of GDP momentum were usually built 
under the assumption of a far more lax fiscal policy than what was actually implemented
26. 
That non-Keynesian sign of the change in output momentum could not be the result of 
Keynesian mechanisms as described in section two of this paper. In the cases under 
discussion, state intervention, as measured by public expenditure, was either cut, or the scale 
of its increase was negligible in comparison with the tax rise. Hence, the precondition for 
activating Keynesian mechanisms was not met. 
Only in Hungary did output momentum slow down during a fiscal consolidation. 
Thus, the first reaction of output in this country could be considered Keynesian. But then, 
when taking into account the size of the fiscal adjustment, that reaction was of at most a 
modest scale. Moreover, the sign of the output momentum change shifted to a non-Keynesian 
one soon after. In 1997-98, that is to say directly after the tightening of fiscal policy, GDP 
was growing at an annual rate of 4.7%. That was its highest momentum over the whole 
transition period in Hungary.  
                                                 
24 In Lithuania in 2000 the ratio of these transfers to GDP was reduced by 3.1 p.p., if one considers spending on savings restitution to be 
transfers (in 1998 the government established a program aimed at compensating savers for the loss of their deposits during the period of 
hyper-inflation at the beginning of the 90’s and in 2000 this program was suspended.) 
25 In the Baltic states registered unemployment was about a half lower. The reason for such a big difference in the registered unemployment 
rate and the rate computed in the poll research, was at a low level of unemployment benefits and the short period during which they could be 
collected.   
26 For example in the case of Lithuania in 2000 the general government deficit was not expected to fall below 5% of GDP. Economists were 
in general doubtful about the government’s capability to reduce public expenditure during the pre-election period. 
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As all the countries under consideration except for Hungary are very small, there is a 
risk of the data on GDP momentum being distorted by the production of an individual large 
company. In the case of GDP growth acceleration such distortions could come only from the 
tradables sector, i.e., from manufacturing
27, since the strongly increased output of an 
individual large company could hardly find domestic buyers. It seems that this risk did not 
materialize in these periods of fiscal adjustments. Only in the case of two consolidation 
episodes, did the manufacturing contribution to gross value added growth significantly exceed 
its share in GVA. Such discrepancy occurred in Lithuania in 2000 and in Estonia in 2000-
2001. Yet, if manufacturing is excluded from GVA, GVA’s momentum would still stay at 
quite a high level in these countries, that is to say, it would amount to 2.8 in Lithuania and 
5.8% in Estonia, and would be larger than in the year before the consolidation, by 3.8 and 5.3 
p.p. respectively.  
 
Table 6. Fiscal Consolidation and GDP Growth. 
   Hungary  Lithuania  Estonia   Latvia 
    1995-96 1997 2000 1997 2000-01   1996-97   2000-01  
a  year  before  2.9  4.7 -3.9 3.9  -0.6  -1.6  2.8 
during consolidation  1.4  7.3 3.8 9.8  6.9  6.0  7.3  GDP momentum 
a year after consolidation  4.6  5.1
28 5.9 4.6
28  6.0  4.8
28  6.1 
              
GDP growth forecasts published before consolidation   2  4  2  3.5  5  3  4 
              
Share of manufacturing in GVA during consolidation   16.5 17.9 15.9  17.2  15.6  14.7 
              
Share of manufacturing in GVA growth during  consolidation   17.6 41.6 21.2  30.6  23.4  15.9 
            
 
In all the countries analyzed one could observe fast export growth during the period 
when fiscal policy was tightened. Its momentum amounted, on average, to 15.9% and it was 
higher by 13 p.p. than a year before fiscal adjustment.  
Except for Hungary, strong domestic demand in the countries’ main trade partners 
contributed to such an export performance. Favorable external conditions do not constitute, 
however, a complete explanation of strong export performance in the fiscal consolidation 
periods. This is particularly true of the second episode of fiscal adjustment in Lithuania
29. In 
that country export momentum more than doubled between 2000 and 2002
30, whilst the 
external economic situation considerably worsened: the GDP growth rate in the EU fell from 
3.6% in 2000 to 0.9% in 2002. Latvia is another example. It is not as striking as the 
Lithuanian case, but is still convincing. The slowdown in the world economy almost halved 
export momentum in 2001-2002 in comparison with its level in 2000. Yet it still exceeded 
6%
31. Only in the case of Estonia did tougher external economic conditions reduce export 
momentum almost to zero in 2001-2002. Being a more open economy
32 than Lithuania and 
Latvia, Estonia has also been more exposed to changes in its external environment.  
                                                 
27 This is the only kind of economic activity which meets two criteria. Firstly, it produces tradables. Secondly, one may find large enterprises 
operating there.  
28 GDP momentum deceleration in 1998 resulted from Russian crisis. 
29 The same analysis for the first episode of fiscal contraction is impossible because of the Russian crisis. This applies to the other Baltic 
states too.   
30 The quoted export momentum was calculated on a constant prices basis. The picture of exports in terms of current prices is exactly the 
opposite. Export grew by 26.8% in 2000, and by 10.7% in 2002.   
31 The quoted export momentum was calculated on a constant prices basis.  In current prices it amounted to 11.7 in 2000-2001 and 12.1% in 
2002.  
32 In 1992-2002 the international trade to GDP ratio amounted to more than 160% in Estonia, and to less than 110% in Lithuania and Latvia. 
In Estonia there was no duty at all until 2000. In that year the government imposed tariffs on food and other commodities from non-EU 
countries and those with which it did not have free trade agreements This was partly to offset a decline in revenues caused by the abolition of 
tax on reinvested profits, and partly because the government wanted to convince the European Commission of its readiness to participate in 
the EU Customs Policy.  
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In Hungary, large forint devaluation seems to have been the main factor explaining 
strong export growth in the fiscal consolidation episode. Keeping the NEER on the level of 
1994 would have been tantamount to the deterioration of external competitiveness by 5%, as 
measured by REER based on ULC in manufacturing, if to pass over the impact of the 
devaluation on inflation, and, thus, on wage pressure. In fact, due to devaluation, that measure 
of external competitiveness improved by 25%. In other countries exchange rate changes can 
hardly account for export performance. NEER strengthened in Lithuania and Latvia. The 
Estonian kroon depreciated during both episodes of fiscal adjustment, but the scale of the 
depreciation was not large. In no period did it exceed 3%. It was not close to the size of prior 
appreciations either. Such a picture could hardly be considered a surprise, as there had been 
currency board in Lithuania and Estonia, and the Latvian lat had been pegged to SDR. 
The profitability of export, and, as a result, its volume, were pushed up by the fast 
growth of labor productivity, which was accompanied by wage moderation. In five out of the 
seven episodes of fiscal tightening, the share of labor remuneration in output decreased – on 
average, by 3.9 p.p. It did not fall only in Lithuania in 1997 and in Latvia in 1996-1997. A 
drop in the share of labor remuneration in output occurred in all periods in which fiscal 
consolidation was solely or mainly driven by a curtailment of public expenditure. This 
suggests that the mechanisms described by the second type of explanation for non-Keynesian 
effects (see section two) could work effectively. It should be stressed once again that the non-
Keynesian effects operated mostly through their influence on export profitability, and not 
through their impact on export prices.  
The evidence that after fiscal consolidation, domestic enterprises started a more 
intensive price competition with foreign businesses than in previous periods is rather limited. 
Export prices relative to the average for 35 industrial countries, if expressed in a common 
currency, decreased only in Hungary
33. During the other periods of fiscal tightening, they 
rose. Only by comparing export prices in domestic currencies, can one find signs of more 
intensive price competition. On such a basis they decreased in relation to the 35 industrial 
countries in Lithuania in 1997 and 2001-2002, and in Latvia in 1997 and 2000-2001. One 
should always bear in mind, however, three important weaknesses of the foregoing analysis. 
Firstly, it disregards the improvement in quality of exported goods, whereas the quite fast 
growth of both exports and export prices since the mid 90’s in the countries analyzed suggests 
that such an improvement had to be made much quicker than for their trade partners
34. 
Secondly, due to the difficulty of acquiring other data, changes in export prices in 
industrialized countries were assumed to be a reference point for economies in transition. Yet 
goods exported by the latter have been competing first and foremost with products from 
developing countries
35. Thirdly, the analysis is based on the implicit assumption that exporters 
are price-makers. However, in the case of the countries under consideration, rather the 
opposite seems to be true, since they are small, and, additionally, not many enterprises 
operating there sell highly processed goods.      
                                                 
33 This resulted solely from the forint devaluation. It allowed Hungarian enterprises to lower export prices in foreign currency and at the same 
time to raise them in the domestic currency much more strongly than in previous years. 
34 This is quite evident for anyone who had the opportunity to buy something in the countries under discussion during the time of 
communism and after its collapse. 
35 For instance, with the exception of Hungary and Estonia, the share of high technology exports in manufacturing exports was about 4 times 
smaller in transition economies than in developed countries.   
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Table 7. Fiscal Consolidation and Export Performance. 
   Hungary   Lithuania   Estonia   Latvia 
    1995-96 1997  2000  1997  2000-01   1996-97   2000-01 
a year before  13.7  19.4  -16.8  2.4  0.5  4.3  -6.4 
during consolidation  10.9  18.6  9.8  29.5  13.3   16.6   9.4  Export momentum 
a year after consolidation  26.4 4.6   21.2   12.0  0.6   4.9   6.3 
              
GDP growth in main trade partners of NMS 
during consolidation (i.e. in EU)  1.8  2.6  3.6   2.6 2.5   2.1   2.5 
              
Total change of NEER during consolidation 
(positive change means its appreciation)  -28.6 16.2   17.0   -2.8  -1.4   6.9   2.6 
              
Total change in share of labor remuneration in output (in p.p)  -5.1  0.3  -3.3  -1.3  -5.0  0.0  -4.7 
              
Total change in export prices relative to the average for 35 
industrial countries ( prices expressed in common currency)  -1.2 14.1   17.4   4.4   7.5   11.1   7.5 
 
The aforementioned non-Keynesian mechanisms’ contributing to export growth could 
also explain at least some part of the investment growth during the fiscal adjustment periods. 
With a non-increasing tax burden, the drop in the share of labor remuneration in output was 
tantamount to the increase of the share of capital remuneration. That raised enterprises’ ability 
to invest. They simply had more money for that purpose. The favourable economic situation 
of enterprises allowed them not only to finance investment from their own resources, but also, 
by improving their credit standing, facilitated access to external financing (see, e.g., Ben 
Bernanke, Mark Gertler, 1989). Since the capital depreciation to output ratio remained stable, 
relatively higher capital remuneration meant a higher rate of return from investment. Hence, it  
not only increased enterprises’ ability, but also their propensity, to invest. Investment 
momentum amounted, on average, to 15,2% and it was higher by 12 p.p. than a year before 
fiscal consolidation.  Only in Lithuania in 2000 it was negative, but already a year later it 
came to 17.0%. Such a lag in investment increase is natural. On the one hand, entrepreneurs 
need time to become convinced that shifts in income structure - towards relatively higher 
remuneration of capital and lower remuneration of labor - are of a more lasting nature. On the 
other hand, the investment process is time-consuming in itself, as it consists of many stages. 
The same phenomenon that occurred in Lithuania was, in fact, also observed in Hungary. In 
1995-1996 the contribution of gross fixed capital formation to investment growth did not even 
exceed 1 p.p., that is to say 7%. Enterprises preferred investing in inventories
36. Thus, they 
must have perceived the increase in their profit margin to be only transitory, as is often the 
case with increases caused by devaluation. They did not start investing in fixed capital until 
the curtailment of public expenditure on wages and salaries managed to dispel those concerns. 
Gross fixed capital formation momentum rose from -4.3% in 1995 to 6.7% in 1996 and then 
to 9.2% in 1997 and 13.3% in 1998 (its highest level over the transition period).          
In five episodes, fiscal policy raised the rate of return from investment in a more direct 
way than through impact on the behavior of employees and employers in wage bargaining.  
Reducing fiscal imbalances made room for large tax cuts. In Hungary in 1995 corporate 
income tax was halved from 36 to 18%
37.  In Lithuania in 1997 the government reduced tax 
on retained earnings to 0%. In 2000 it lowered the CIT general rate from 29 to 24% (and to 
15% in 2002
38). In Estonia in 2000 tax on reinvested earnings was abolished. In Latvia in 
2001 the CIT general rate was cut from 25 to 22% (see, e.g., Vahram Stepanyan, 2003, pp.26-
                                                 
36 Inventories were growing despite the decline in GDP momentum. If their increase had been caused by a false evaluation of demand by 
entrepreneurs, strong adjustments would have occurred in the following years. 
37 It was reduced to the former level only in the previous year; prior to 1994 it amounted to 40%; see, e.g., Gabor P. Kiss and György 
Szapáry (2000, p. 255). 
38 In this year government, under the pressure of the European Commission, agreed to reintroduce the tax on retained earnings. 
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hard to consider this source of investment increase to be non-Keynesian.  
So let’s return to purely non-Keynesian mechanisms. Aside from those contributing to 
wage moderation, it seems that some other non-Keynesian mechanisms were at work too. 
Fiscal consolidation clearly limited uncertainty as to macroeconomic stability. It not only 
lowered the risk of government insolvency, but also reduced external imbalance.  Having a 
positive impact on both export and domestic demand, it was followed by significant net 
export improvement only in two cases. In Hungary net export increased from -5.9% of GDP 
in 1994 to -1.1% of GDP in 1996, and in Lithuania from -10.3% of GDP in 1998 to -6.5% of 
GDP in 2000. However, an increase in export relative to GDP, which occurred in all countries 
during the tightening of fiscal policy, was equivalent to broadening their capability to service 
and repay foreign liabilities. On average, the export to GDP ratio rose, in total, by 6.7 p.p. 
Domestic enterprises were extensively utilizing imported goods as an input for export. This 
feature of international trade used by the countries under analysis reduced the risk of 
widening the external imbalance, should a negative shock in external demand occur. At the 
same time, due to GDP growth acceleration, the same value of foreign liabilities presented a 
lower percentage of output than before. Thereby their servicing or repayment presented a 
smaller burden for the economy than in the case of slower growth
39. Besides, fiscal 
adjustment meant an improvement of the composition of domestic expenditure financed by 
foreign savings. Firstly, as is obvious, they started financing more private expenditure than 
government expenditure, the latter being, on average, more wasteful than the former. Not only 
the foreign capital inflow that was actually financing the budget deficit decreased, but also the 
value of loans taken out directly by governments abroad, and those loans are considered to 
have a particularly negative impact on markets’ perception of a country’s macroeconomic 
stability. In one case, i.e., that of Estonia in 2000-2001, general government net foreign assets 
even became positive. Secondly, foreign savings were financing, to a larger degree than prior 
to consolidation, investment rather than consumption. In all cases but that of Lithuania in 
2000, the share of investment in GDP increased. The increase amounted, on average, to 2.5 
p.p. Higher investment may lead to a rise in external competitiveness and, as a result, higher 
future exports, expanding the capability of a country to service foreign debt. With the 
exception of Latvia in 1996-1997, the national savings to GDP ratio also rose, but only in the 
two aforementioned cases of Hungary in 1995-1996 and Lithuania in 2000 was its rise large 
enough to reduce the needs of foreign financing for domestic expenditure considerably.  
The lower risk of financial crisis found its reflection in a drop in the risk premium 
included in interest rates, and in an increase of the net inflow of foreign direct investment. 
These two changes conducive to faster output growth were notably visible during the first 
episodes of fiscal adjustment. In spite of structural reforms, market participants considered the 
stability of the countries under discussion to be rather poor. This applied particularly to 
Lithuania and Latvia. Only after the reduction of fiscal imbalances, was the assessment 
vehemently revised. 
                                                 
39 Not in all cases was a short term acceleration of output momentum observed (see Hungary in 1995-1996). However, much more important 
for the solvency of a country is the fact that in the longer term, lack of fiscal consolidation would have an unambiguously adverse impact on 
economic growth. Firstly, budget deficit reduces investments by enterprises. On the one hand, it means lower domestic savings (if not all 
households are aware that the deficit implies higher taxes in the future). On the other hand, it increases the uncertainty concerning the future 
tax burden and rate of inflation. High uncertainty lowers capital formation all the more, when potential investments are lees reversible and 
when the degree of capital account liberalisation is higher – what enables entrepreneurs to transfer capital to countries where the risk is not as 
high. Secondly, deficit reduces employment. Lower investment is equivalent to employees being equipped more poorly in capital and, 
subsequently, to lower marginal product of labour. For the employment to be at the level corresponding to higher capital stock, wages would 
have to be lower. Wages, however, are often regulated by the state (government introduces minimal wages, finances various benefits for the 
unemployed and non-employed, hires employees in the state sector). Finally, deficit may result in the collapse of the economy, should the 
increase in public debt remain unstopped in due time.  
Empirical evaluation of budget deficit’s impact on output is provided e.g. by Ross Levine, David Renelt (1992), Stanley Fischer (1993), 
William Easterly, Carlos A. Rodriguez and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (1994), Michael Bleaney, Norman Gemmell, Richard Kneller (2001). 
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So, firstly, over the earlier period of fiscal adjustment, risk premium
40 in Baltics fell, 
on average, by 9.3 p.p. Over the subsequent period, the average size of the risk premium drop 
amounted to 3.3 p.p. In four cases, that fall meant a real decrease in the costs of external 
funding for business operations. The real lending rate for businesses dropped in Lithuania in 
2000, in Estonia in 2000-2001, and in Latvia in both periods of fiscal adjustment
41. The 
decrease in nominal interest rates, even if not accompanied by a fall in real terms, favoured 
external funding of business operations, particularly of longer-term needs, that is to say, of 
investments. Nominal interest rates set the minimal rate of return for a long term project – if 
installments, as is quite often the case, are non-growing in nominal terms. In such a situation, 
high nominal interest rates mean high real costs of the first installments (even if the real 
interest rate is quite low), since the debtor must repay to the creditor a sum protecting the 
latter against the decline of the real value of the principal. It is hard to smooth the real costs of 
installments, for creditors are reluctant to grant another loan for the same collateral
42. Hence, 
a project that is financed by a loan, has to generate in all periods an income large enough to 
pay off an installment of the highest real value, i.e., in the case of non-growing installments – 
the first one. The experience of Latvia is most striking in this respect. The increase in the 
amount of credit granted to enterprises during the second period of fiscal adjustment was 
more than twice as large as the increase during the first period of fiscal adjustment
43, although 
real interest rates were almost exactly the same in both episodes. During the second 
adjustment, the contribution of the rise of credit of more than 5 years’ maturity to the increase 
of total credit to the private sector came to 43.0%. During the first adjustment, that 
contribution did not exceed 12%
44. Also, in the case of Estonia, a fall in the costs of bank 
loans increased their attractiveness for enterprises. In Lithuania after disturbances in the 
banking system
45 in 1995-1996, credit to enterprises rose by barely 6% in nominal terms in 
1997, i.e., its nominal momentum did not exceed the inflation rate. By contrast, in 2001-2002, 
it grew by more than 56%. Yet in relation to GDP, this growth rate was less impressive. 
However, an analysis of the effects of a decrease in interest rates should not be limited to the 
availability of loans. A reduction in the cost of credit should be accompanied by a reduction in 
the cost of capital from other sources. Particularly in those cases where the reduction of the 
interest rate on bank loans did not lead to a significant growth in the importance of such loans 
for funding business operations, the price of other financing opportunities, being bank loan 
substitutes, could still be more favourable and enterprises could benefit from them. 
   Secondly, FDI net inflow increased during five episodes of fiscal adjustment. The 
increase was observed in Hungary, in Lithuania in 1997, in Estonia in 1997 and 2000-2001 
and Latvia in 1997 and, on average, it amounted in total to 3.2% of GDP. The gross fixed 
capital formation was directly increased by green-field investments. However, a large part of 
FDI took the from of the acquisition of privatized state enterprises, and thus had no direct 
impact on capital formation. Still, its indirect influence is not to be undervalued. On the one 
hand, the buyers of the privatised companies mostly made a commitment to invest. On the 
                                                 
40 In the case of Latvia and Estonia, risk premium was calculated as a difference between the lending rate in those countries and in the euro 
zone respectively. In the case of Lithuania the lending rate in the United States was considered to be the point of reference, since until 31 
January 2002 the litas was pegged to the dollar. Because of potentially large differences between individual countries as to the structure of 
borrowers and loan maturity, this difference may be treated as an approximation only of the risk premium. 
41 The data for Latvia refer to the lending rate not only for enterprises, but also for households. For that reason, the GDP deflator was used 
while calculating real interest rates, instead of PPI.  
42 The less developed the banking sector is, the more important is the average asymmetry of information between creditors and potential 
debtors, and consequently the larger is this reluctance.   
43 The difference could be to some extent the aftermath of a banking crisis in Latvia in 1995. A result of that crisis was the bankruptcy of the 
largest bank (Banka Baltija); see e.g. Wojciech Morawski (2000, p. 359).  
44 Time series, which would present the duration of credit to enterprises exclusively, are not commonly available.  
45 In 1995 there was a banking crisis in Lithuania. As a result, 16 out of 28 banks, including the two largest ones, ceased to operate (Wojciech 
Morawski, 2002, p. 359). 
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of efficiency in the privatised companies, and thus, their capacity to invest
46.  
However, one should bear in mind that in the Baltic states the strong growth in 
investment in 1996-1997 could in some part have resulted from its previous sharp decline, by 
far exceeding the output fall
47. In 1990-1995 the investment to output ratio dropped by about 
12% in Estonia, 24% in Lithuania, and 56% in Latvia.  A relatively long period of recession, 
lasting in those countries up to 6 years, meant a relatively strong aging of capital, and as a 
result limited the opportunity for GDP growth without capital expenditure. Besides, a large 
part of the capital stock, accumulated during communism, could not be used after 
communism’s collapse, at least not without undertaking additional investment (see, e.g., 
Stanisław Gomułka, 1998). It can be assumed, without risking a major mistake, that  five-six 
years after  the beginning of transition, all capital resources that could be used by new entities 
had found their application. In the case of Estonia and Lithuania, the quite strong growth of 
GDP in 1995-1996, amounting to 4.1 and 4.0% on average, also contributed to the increase of 
investment momentum during the fiscal adjustment
48.   
 
Table 8. Fiscal Consolidation and Investment. 
   Hungary   Lithuania   Estonia   Latvia 
    1995-96  1997  2000 1997  2000-01   1996-97   2000-01  
a year before  24.3  12.0  -2.1  12.5  -15.4  -11.1  1.7 
during consolidation  14.2  36.6  -11.8 25.1   18.7  11.3  12.0 
Investment 
momentum 
a year after consolidation  8.9  19.8   17.0  -0.1  17.5 52.4   4.0 
              
Total change in net export to GDP ratio during consolidation 
(in p.p.) 
4.8 -0.6  3.8 -0.1   1.2  -6.1   -0.9 
            
Total change in export to GDP ratio during consolidation 
(in p.p.) 
9.9 1.2  5.5   11.3  13.4  4.1   1.7 
              
Total change in investment to GDP ratio during consolidation 
(in p.p.) 
5.0  2.1  -2.1   3.2   3.2  5.2  0.7 
              
Total change in national savings to GDP ratio  
during consolidation (in p.p.) 
8.2 1.0  3.1   0.2   1.8  -0.6   3.1 
              
Total change in risk premium during consolidation (in p.p.)    -7.3  -2.2 -1.8   -3.4  -18.9   -4.3 
            
Total change in credit to enterprises to GDP ratio  
during consolidation (in p.p.) 
    3.2   7.2   0.9
49  2.9   7.9 
            
Total change in net inflow of FDI to GDP ratio  
during consolidation (in p.p.) 
2.3  1.8  -1.2   2.3   3.9  5.6  -2.9 
 
                                                 
46 Foreign-owned enterprises were much better equipped with capital than enterprises of purely domestic ownership. They were also marked 
by a larger -and growing -ability to export (see, e.g., IMF, 1999; IMF, 2000). For instance, the goods produced by these foreign owned 
enterprises could be sold under a brand name, which was recognised more easily in countries where those goods were to be distributed. 
Hence, the positive influence of fiscal policy consolidation on foreign direct investment inflow presented simultaneously an additional 
channel through which the former stimulated export. That channel is not discussed more thoroughly in this section because in the short term 
it could hardly be of comparable importance to the one mentioned, because of the delay between undertaking an investment and starting 
production. These delays were shortened by making the investment in privatised companies, i.e. already operating companies. But 
privatisation, even if measured in terms of revenue, gradually died out. 
47 The decrease in investment, and as a result in GDP, after the change of the coordination mechanism, can be at least partly explained by the 
end of communism’s investments, which represented a waste of resources. More can be read about the difficulties connected with comparing 
GDP before and during the transition period in research by Anders Aslund (2002). 
48 With an increase of output, the desired level of capital grows as well. The observed GDP growth is commonly argued to be one of the most 
important investment determinants; cf. e.g. Hollis B. Chenery (1952); Robert S. Chirinko (1993); Donald A. Hay, Derek Morris (1991). 
49 In Estonia in 200-2001 credit to enterprises increased by 5.2% of GDP if the assets of leasing companies are added to credit. 
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With the exception of Hungary, fiscal tightening was followed by a strong rise in 
private consumption. Its momentum amounted, on average, to 5.0% and was almost twice as 
high as a year before fiscal adjustment. This phenomenon cannot be explained without 
recalling non-Keynesian mechanisms
50. Yet they manifested themselves rather in fast growing 
disposable income than in  dissaving, since household savings were already very low before 
consolidation (in the case of Latvia they were even negative.) A strong growth of export and 
investment made GDP and, hence, disposable income grow fast, what in turn enabled 
households to raise their consumption. However, it should be stressed that a strong growth in 
consumption occurred despite the difficult situation on the labor market, or the shift of income 
from individuals with a higher propensity for consumption to those with a stronger propensity 
to save (as the share of labor remuneration in output declined and the share of capital 
remuneration increased
51). The large range of needs that had never been satisfied under 
communism raised the momentum of private consumption in the 90’s. However, the 
importance of this factor has diminished with time. It could be helpful in explaining the fast 
growth of private consumption during the first episodes of fiscal contraction, but not that 
during subsequent ones. 
In the case of Hungary private consumption dropped in total by 11.1% in 1995-1996. 
The size of this drop was even larger than the drop in households’ disposable income (which 
fell by 3.6%), and thus, a much larger than the Keynesian absolute income hypothesis would 
suggest. The momentum of private consumption clearly decelerated before the tightening of 
fiscal policy. In 1994 it declined from 3.4% in 1993 to 0.2%, whilst the momentum of 
households’ disposable income rose from -3.9% to 3.5%. Households began rebuilding their 
savings, which had decreased to 10% of households’ disposable income in 1993. By 1996 
households’ savings rate stayed below the average for the transition period. Thereby, one can 
consider the years 1994-1996 as a period in which consumption, which had not adjusted to the 
fall in output at the beginning of transition, was corrected.   
 
Table 9. Fiscal Consolidation and Private Consumption. 
   Hungary  Lithuania  Estonia  Latvia 
    1995-96 1997 2000 1997 2000-01  1996-97  2000-01 
a  year  before  0.2  6.5 3.2 9.2  -2.7  -1.7  3.7 
during consolidation  -5.4  5.3 6.4 7.8  5.9  7.4  7.6  Private consumption 
a year after consolidation  1.9  4.7 4.0 4.3  9.4  1.1  6.9 
6. Conclusions 
 
Using panel data estimation techniques we found evidence that in the NMS 
discretionary fiscal consolidation contributed substantially to the acceleration of output 
growth even in the short term. However, we were not able to identify unambiguously the 
channels through which non-Keynesian effects occur: we found some evidence confirming 
only the existence of the export channel.  
Yet then we went one step further than in other studies devoted to this topic. We 
carried out a qualitative analysis of episodes of strong fiscal adjustment in the NMS. It 
showed that their experiences in that respect were quite close to those of developed countries. 
The main difference was that in the NMS strong fiscal adjustment was almost always 
accompanied by acceleration in output momentum, that is to say, non-Keynesian effects 
                                                 
50 However, the optimism of households in Lithuania and Latvia in 2000 could partly be the result of the negotiations on EU accession, 
which in the case of those countries had started in December 1999.   
51 Persons receiving a majority of their income from work must, by all means, demonstrate a higher propensity to consume than capital 
owners, since savings are source of capital. If capital owners demonstrated a higher propensity to consume than workers, they would lose 
their property.  
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explained by vehement reassessment of the stability of the NMS, the market sentiment being 
rather negative before the reduction of fiscal imbalances. This peculiar bonus of prior low 
credibility applied to the adjustments which were undertaken in mid 90’s. However, later, the 
fiscal consolidation contributed to the acceleration of output momentum mainly because it 
concentrated on cuts of public expenditure, and not because of any special features of NMS. 
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